Skip to content

Podcast

Graham Allison on the Global Realignment- Iran, China, Israel, Greenland

All-In with Chamath, Jason, Sacks & Friedberg

Source ↗ ← All highlights
  • Iran Conflict Is Far More Uncertain Than It Looks
    • There is far more uncertainty than public messaging admits about the Iran conflict and its objectives.
    • Graham Allison cites multiple conflicting rationales from Trump and Netanyahu and warns fog of war plus political spin cloud likely outcomes. Transcript: Chamath Palihapitiya Let’s start with Iran. The U.S. And Israel in the middle of an attack on Iran, and the supreme leader is dead, but the regime is still holding on to power. Where do you think this conflict will take us, and are we sleepwalking into World War III? Graham Allison Well, thank you again for having me back. I will have a great podcast. I enjoyed the summit. And I’m sorry we’re not there in person to catch up. But I think about Iran, how much to say? So this could be a long lecture. Let me just do four or five quick points. First point, most important point, is that there’s more questions than answers. So there’s a huge level of uncertainty currently about what’s happening and about what’s likely to happen. Part of this is Klaus Schwitz’s famous fog of war. But there’s a fog of war that’s actually increased because we got two big fog machines adding to the confusion. Namely, Trump and the administration on the one hand and Bibi on the other. And then we got all the chattering class around this. So I would say, why did Trump decide to go to war now? There’s six different reasons he and the administration have given, and each one they back around. What’s the objective? There’s five different objectives, back it around. And when is this war going to end? You know, a day, a week, a month, who knows? So it’s very uncomfortable to recognize how uncertain things are. And most of the conversation about it tries to make it more confident. I think the place to start is there’s a huge amount of uncertainty. Having said that, I’ll still give you my prejudices about a few of the points. (Time 0:01:14)
  • Kinetic Success Doesn’t Guarantee Political Victory
    • The U.S. and Israeli military and intelligence performance has been extraordinary in the Iran strikes.
    • Allison praises precision operations but cautions that destroying a regime is easier than building a stable successor, citing Iraq and Afghanistan failures. Transcript: Graham Allison Point two, this has been an extraordinary demonstration of supreme military power and supreme intelligence power. U.S. Military and the intelligence community and the Israeli counterparts have been way, way, way off the charts. And I think this should make all Americans proud of what’s been built over this decade, two decades of investment, but especially the past decade. The third point, there’s no tears to be shed for Khamenei and the Islamic Republic regime. It’s an evil leader, an evil regime. There’s no bad thing that could happen to them that we shouldn’t be cheering out of that. Next point, though, breaking something’s a lot easier than building something. And destroying targets is something that our military knows very well how to do. Building a new regime, regime change, is something that we know historically doesn’t work very well, at least in Iraq and Afghanistan. We had every word said that’s been said in this case, and we then went in all in and spent more than a billion dollars of many, many thousands of American lives. And when we went to Afghanistan, the Taliban were ruling. When we left Afghanistan, the Taliban were ruling. So I would say, unfortunately, it’s against the backdrop that’s hard. The next point is slightly more controversial, but I think this is Beebe’s war. If your readers don’t remember Moby Dick, they should go look at it again. Ahab had this fixation, obsession with the white whale and tried to find a way to kill the white whale whenever he could. For the last two decades, that’s been Beebe’s number one, number two, number three agenda. He’s tried to sell that war to Obama, to Trump one, to Biden, and how he succeeded in mesmerizing Trump, whom I thought had his number. I’m surprised. So I’m pro-Israel, but anti-Bibi in this respect. I think that I understand he’s brilliant politically, but I don’t think this, the arguments that were made that Trump has actually repeated that Iran was about to attack us, I see no Evidence for that. That Iran was about to get a nuclear weapon, I see no evidence for that. That Iran was building an ICBM that was going to attack the US, I see no evidence for that. (Time 0:03:01)
  • Treat Sudden Military Moves As Tactical Windows Not Grand Strategy
    • Avoid assuming strategic coherence when leaders act impulsively; expect mixed motives and tactical windows.
    • Allison suggests Trump likely seized a tactical opportunity (leadership exposed publicly) rather than following a grand strategy. Transcript: Chamath Palihapitiya Let me double click on that point. You mentioned there’s multiple reasons that the administration has messaged for doing this, multiple views on what success looks like, multiple timelines on ending it, and that This is B.B.’s war. How do you think Trump was motivated to do this? What is the real motivation? And I will ask this in the context of the big delegation and visit to China coming up next month. Is Trump motivated fundamentally to create leverage with China and use this as a tool to try and maximize his negotiating leverage going into the Chinese negotiations? Graham Allison That’s a great question. And I wish that answer was, this was all part of a grand strategy. That would make me feel hugely better. But I try to do Trumpology, and I was actually having dinner last night with Bill O’Reilly, a former student, who I think is one of the better Trumpologists for trying to interpret. And we were going back and forth through this. It’s easy enough to see why the window, tactically, the window in which this attack occurred was chosen, because here you got 40, you got the Supreme Leader and 40 of the other leaders Of Iran out in public. So that’s an opportunity as a target. And the best opportunity has come along. The question is, why would you be attacking them? And especially Trump, given his campaign and his previous views about not repeating the mistakes of the people that took us into endless, winless wars. And I think it’s, I mean, I think Bibi is a magician. I think his single-mindedness is impressive. I think his agility in making arguments and developing arguments is impressive. How he managed to persuade Trump this was a good idea for the U.S. Now, I don’t have a good idea. And I think that, I think if I listen to the reasons why even the people closest around them have given, or that Trump have given, they don’t seem persuasive. Now, partly, Trump is erratic. Partly, he sort of, you know, acts on the basis of instincts. Somehow, it came to him that this was, you know, something that could be done. I think actually Bibi painted a pretty, I mean, the upside of this picture, if it’s successful, and I hope now that we’ve gone into what it would be, would be redefining security in the Middle East for a generation. (Time 0:05:56)
  • Democratic Iran Is Possible But Improbably Unrealistic
    • A democratic Iran would be transformative but is highly unlikely; more plausible outcomes are weaker regimes or military-dominated successors.
    • Allison warns post-regime chaos could resemble Syria or an extended civil war rather than liberal democracy. Transcript: Jason Calacanis We’ve seen the Gulf monarchies evolve, human rights, but they’re still monarchies. You have one other, I guess, democracy in the region in Israel, but this could be extraordinary if it was a democracy. What would that mean to the global chessboard? Graham Allison Well, it’s a good question. I mean, if this could occur, it would be spectacular. Even, I think, but I would say this is way, way, way too ambitious. There’s a hundred things that would be wonderful outcomes, better than what’s likely, that would be short of that. I remember in Iraq, after Bush failed to find nuclear weapons, which was the initial, I would say, somewhat cucked up rationale for our going into Iraq, Condi Rice, who was the secretary, Gave a speech about, well, how wonderful it’ll be when Iraq is a democracy and market economy, quote, radiating stability through the Middle East. So we’re pretty good at doing I Have a Dream, you know, in that version. I think that’s a way, way, way stretch. I would be very happy with a regime there that simply was not about building nuclear weapons, was not about building missiles that threatened the U.S. And our friends and allies in the region, and not about supporting proxies. And if it’s a pretty cruel regime, unfortunately, that’s unfortunate for the Iranian people. The Persian people, when I’m a student of history, I love Persia. You know, I remember Cyrus, and I remember the Peloponnesian War. I remember, you know, this is a fantastic culture and history. They’ve been hijacked by a terrible, terrible group of people. And if those people can be somehow ousted, you know, wonderful for Iranian people and wonderful for the world, if I were betting it, again, I’d say go back to the first point. Questions, uncertainty, finding signals in the noise, extremely difficult. But if I were betting it, it’ll end up that the guys with the guns will in some version be the next iteration. (Time 0:12:04)
  • Regime Collapse Risks Long Chaotic Aftermath
    • Dismantling Iran risks leaving a 100 million‑person state in tatters and breeding extremism; nation-building has poor historical odds.
    • Allison cites Iraq and Afghanistan as cautionary examples of long, costly failures to build stable regimes. Transcript: Chamath Palihapitiya You think there’s more damage that can be done by being more successful? You know, if we think back to Iraq, Iran is twice as many people, 100 million versus 50 million, four times the land area, a much better equipped military, and arguably the military system, The regime, is embedded in every aspect of industry. So the more successful the United States is in dismantling the Iranian regime, and as was advised by Condoleezza Rice, who apparently was just in the White House today and advising The president and publicly stated, it’s time to finish them off, it’s time to go all the way, etc. Does that not then leave a country with no infrastructure, no leadership, 100 million people in tatters? And that’s the classic breeding ground for some of these extremist groups to seize control and seize power. And we don’t have the resources to go in and have another multi-decade Afghanistan-Iraq problem. Graham Allison I’m afraid I agree, yes. I think that the uncertainties about that, I mean, you can do four or five different scenarios for how this might conceivably end. It could end up being an extended civil war in Iran among the various national groups, even some of them possibly seceding. So again, fairly chaotic. Look like Syria plus, okay? It could look like Iran or Afghanistan. Well, excuse me, we were there for more than a decade with unlimited resources, hardly any constraints on the number of people. And how did that work out? So I say that I’m a small C conservative and kind of think history is not always, certainly not the only guide, but it’s a good place to start. (Time 0:16:34)
  • Taiwan Invasion This Year Is Unlikely
    • The near-term risk of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 2026–27 is low, roughly prediction‑market odds (~5%).
    • Allison cites China’s peaceful reunification strategy, Taiwan’s domestic politics, PLA command disruptions, and risk of US involvement as deterrents. Transcript: Chamath Palihapitiya We move to China? Because I think that, again, this is going to be the big story over the next month. You’ve said publicly that ousting Maduro from Venezuela could embolden China to accelerate a Taiwan takeover. The CIA, it has been reported in media, warned Tim Cook of Apple and other tech companies about a possible invasion as soon as next year. You’ve separately met publicly with Chinese officials. What’s your view on the likelihood and the timeline of a China attempted takeover of Taiwan? And what are these kind of motivating factors that might make that happen sooner? Graham Allison So let me clarify. I’m not sure or I may have been misinterpreted, but obviously the Chinese watch very carefully. They study wars and they will learn lessons from what’s going on here. But I don’t think the Venezuelan operation, other than making them feel envious about the capabilities, will impact their likelihood of attacking Taiwan. So Taiwan, number one, I think the likelihood of an attack on Taiwan this year or next year, or even into 28, but let me just do 26 and 27, absent some major provocation by Taiwan or some Other third incident is very low. I put it at about where the prediction markets are five percent or something low so i’m not counting on that why is that so low i’m just curious why five percent yeah okay because first They’ve they have a theory of the case of what they call peaceful reunification and they think things are involving in that direction. The theory of the case is that the current government, which is a DPP government, currently is stymied by its opposition in the parliament, so they can’t even buy the arms sales that We previously gave them. There’s $11 billion arms sales that the Chinese have complained about, but Taiwan, the legislature probably won’t buy half of that. Okay. So the current president is struggling. There’s going to be an election in January 28th, and they think it’s likely that the former party, the KMT, will be elected. Somebody that will be much more sympathetic to China and to an evolving relationship. So that’s number one. Of all of their military leadership. I mean, it’s hard to believe, and you read about in the paper from time to time that he fired this guy, he fired this guy. He’s fired the equivalent of every four-star in our whole political system, and every combatant commander, and every commander who would be commanding the forces over, you know, To deal with Taiwan. So while they’ve been building up that military capability, it takes a long time to get that back into order, in my view. So I would say that part makes me feel less likely. Third, I think he understands that if he were to do this, there’s a risk, not a certainty, but a risk that the U.S. Would become involved, and that the impact of that either on China’s economy, which he’s got to worry about first, and also on its evolution would be significant. So I’m looking for, and finally, in Trump, he has the most accommodating president that China is likely to see with respect to Taiwan. So Trump has made no secrets. I mean, he talks publicly of his views about Taiwan. And I think a couple of the memoirs, there’s this discussion where he’s in the Oval and he’s talking about Taiwan. And he picked somebody asked him about Taiwan. He picks up one of those Sharpies and goes, you know, on a spot on the Resolute desk. And he says, that’s Taiwan. Then he draws his hand around the whole desk. He said, that’s China. So I’d say I’m less worried about Taiwan on the current path. (Time 0:24:28)
  • Secure Semiconductor Supply Chains Now
    • Hedge the semiconductor supply chain by onshoring and diversifying chip production because 96% of advanced chips come from one island.
    • Allison stresses TSMC concentration makes Taiwan a critical strategic vulnerability. Transcript: Graham Allison When he’s asked about this, he says the biggest threat that he’s ever seen is the fact that 96% of the advanced semiconductors come from one small island that could become cut off. So TSMC, as you all have discussed before, produces the advanced semiconductors for essentially everybody of whom we’re the principal consumer. And we prevent them shipping this to China. That’s a pretty complicated situation to begin with. Secondly, Taiwan is halfway around the world, as President Trump says, and 90 miles off the shore of China. And we’re far away, and we have a lot of other things to worry about. So it’s a little bit like Cuba. So inherently indefensible if China were seriously determined to either destroy it or to take it. And the Shanghai Communique, there’s been an agreement of maintaining a status quo, with the U.S. Commitment being what’s called strategic ambiguity, in which the U.S. And China have been committed to Taiwan. Internal development is left to its own device, and China doesn’t use military force to prevent that. But we say Taiwan, there’s one China, and the only China’s capital is Beijing. And then we have a little bit of an ambiguous way to talk about the relationship between Taiwan and China, but certainly letting it evolve in any way that the parties would be prepared To live with. (Time 0:30:11)
  • China’s Global Push Is Built On Rapid Power Gains
    • China’s geopolitical push is driven by an internal narrative of meteoric rise and perceived U.S. decline.
    • Allison highlights vast gains since 2000 across GDP, trade, and advanced tech underpinning China’s ambition for top status. Transcript: Graham Allison Is one you raised and we talked about the last time, which is interesting. I think we agreed. So let me just, again, for people that don’t remember, start. So first, China is a meteoric rising power. Never has a country risen so far so fast on so many different dimensions. If you take a snapshot of the year 2000 and the year 2025 and compare China on any metric of power, it’s just dumbfounding, dumbfounding. So a country that I have compared it to kind of like a Formula One racing, a country that we couldn’t find in our rearview mirror in 2020, or sorry, 2000, because it was so far behind. We have trouble finding in our rearview mirror today because it’s beside us or in many races even slightly ahead of us. So that’s GDP. It was less than 5% of global, or it was less than a quarter the U.S. In 2000. Today, by purchasing power parity, it’s 25% larger. In 2000, trading, it was 5% of global. Today, and we were 15. Today, it’s 35 and we’re 25. If you do advanced tech in any arena, take 5G, my goodness, take EVs, my goodness, take whatever. Okay, so rapidly rising power. That’s essential. That’s the infrastructure for their grand narrative, which is the inexorable rise of China to its natural position in the international order, which they think is at the top of the Pyramid. So they are absolutely determined to be number one in their own arena to begin with. And then after that, you know, maybe more. (Time 0:33:38)
  • Robotics Partly Offsets China’s Demographic Drag
    • Demographics and automation create both challenge and mitigation: China faces population decline but has aggressively robotized manufacturing.
    • Allison observed factories (e.g., Xiaomi) with full robotic lines and notes China leads global factory robotics. Transcript: Graham Allison Your space than mine because i’ve tried to follow but elon says there’s going to be more robots than people okay yeah and if you ask him where where are the most advanced robots in the world The ones that are kicking his ass or he worries about their china So they’ve got a huge number of robot companies. When I was there in last, when was I last there? In January, I went to see a factory, Xiaomi, the phone company. Xiaomi, three years ago, decided they would make cars. After watching Apple spend $10 million not able to make a car, within three years, that factory is producing cars right now. And they have a huge demand for these cars. They have three lines. One of the lines is all robots. So they’re putting a lot of robots to work. More than half of the factory worker robots in the world are in China. And so some of the people are saying, well, you know, demographics is going to be not so big a problem because if demographics is only a problem because of workers, we’re going to have Workers. In fact, the American workers are more worried about taking our jobs. So that’s now the issue for the impact on education. They have a number of people that have been educated in arenas that are now no longer high-demand jobs. Unfortunately, we have a lot of that too. I mean, if you look at people, college graduates now that graduated in, I don’t know, DEI subjects, they’re having trouble getting jobs. So I would say it’s a little, there are more similarities there than differences. The other thing is Chinese have demonstrated a much greater capacity or readiness to adopt and adapt to new technologies. (Time 0:37:20)
  • You Can Get Greenland’s Value Without Seizing It
    • Greenland is strategically useful for U.S. basing and missile defense, but ownership or invasion isn’t necessary.
    • Allison argues leases or bases suffice and Trump’s Greenland theatrics were partly political theatre. Transcript: Graham Allison Big question so let me start with the bottom line i think that at least from the judgments of the people whom I respect the most, we, the U.S., can get everything we want from Greenland Without invading it or owning it. So Greenland has been an important base for missile defenses, a tool base. We had two other bases that we closed, but we can open as many other bases as we want, and they’re very amenable to that. I think President Trump’s right to say, well, yeah, but I don’t want a short-term lease on these bases. I would say a 99-year lease sounds like a pretty good lease to me. In 99 years, God knows what’s going to be happening. But to the extent that missile defense is part of it, which it is, I would say that’s a part. For the naval component, yes, I think that as the Arctic melts, you already now have an opening of sea lanes. The way that the territorial ownership, the abutters have their claim to the local and the regional. And there the main claims are Russian and Canadian. We have a chunk from Alaska and then Greenland would be a piece of that. So I would say that’s relevant. But those sea lanes, at least for the Navy people I talk to, they’re not as important as they used to be because now there’s so many different ways to get it. You’re not going to try to blockade a waterway with ships. You’re going to do it with smart minds or you’re going to do it simply by attacking the ships on the away. And if it’s underwater, underwater is pretty much all the same. But it’s good to have narrow places and shallow places for looking for things. So I would say I think Trump’s Greenland venture was more like for fun. Plus, I mean, I think one of the people that knows him well says, remember, he’s first off a reality TV producer and star. So he just has fun starting with a drama, getting people very excited, letting the tension rise, and then finding a resolution. And I think we’re on track to a resolution there. (Time 0:40:27)
  • Remember The 80 80 9 Fragility Framework
    • The 80-80-9 framework summarizes the fragile peace: 80 years since a great-power war, 80 years since nuclear use, and nine nuclear states today.
    • Allison uses the mnemonic to show the post‑WWII order is abnormal and must be actively maintained. Transcript: Graham Allison So these are three numbers, each of which is the answer to a question. And if you can remember the three numbers and you can identify the question to which each one is the answer, you have the big picture about international security in the lifetime of yourself And even your parents. That’s virtually everybody who’s alive today. So the first 80 is the answer to what? How long it’s been since a world war. How many years since a great power war, since a world war? Yeah. Now, whoa, wait a minute. 80 years? This is the longest peace in recorded history since Rome. This is not natural. This is very abnormal. This didn’t happen by accident. This was what the people who founded the international order after World War II were trying to build a new world order. Because they had just lived through a terrible World War II. Simply one generation before, they remembered, hey, there was World War I. So if we just keep doing this, we should expect World War III. It should have already happened. If it could have happened, it’s a human missile Crisis. So no great power war. Fantastic. But a fragile, a work in progress all the time, eroding, inevitably, for many, many different reasons. Second 80. How many years? Since we’ve had a nuclear bomb go off. Fantastic. So think about that. If you had gone, if there had been prediction markets, and you had gone in 1945 or 50, you would have got 10,000 to one odds against that. It’s impossible. The weapon that ended World War II, and you’re not ever going to see any use of those weapons in war? Whoa. Jason Calacanis And then nine? The number of countries, nation states, that have nuclear bombs today. Graham Allison Fantastic. Right. Now, how in the world could you have only nine countries having nuclear weapons? Nuclear weapons being your kind of ultimate security blanket. Again, John Kennedy, 1963, said by the 70s, there’ll be 25 or 30 nuclear weapon states. He thought that as states required the capability to build nuclear weapons they would do so. Today 90 95 states could have nuclear weapons in a year or two if they decided to build them. Actually into the 70s Sweden had a serious nuclear problem. South Korea had a nuclear problem. Taiwan had a nuclear problem. U.S. Closed those down, created a so-called non-proliferation regime. That’s accounted for this time. But I would say, again, fragile, eroding, not likely to be sustained. So when I try to do my giving thanks for, you know, things that I should be thankful for, thankful for 80 years without a great power war, if there were a great power war, you and I, we wouldn’t Be here. And we wouldn’t be having this conversation and all the other issues we have to deal with. So I would say the 80, the 80 and 90, we should not take for great. We should give thanks for the work that was done to build them. (Time 0:49:18)
  • Wealth Concentration Threatens US Political Stability
    • Rising domestic inequality in the U.S. is a real political risk that can fuel populism or socialist policies.
    • Allison warns concentration of gains among top deciles invites radical political responses unless wealth is more broadly shared. Transcript: Chamath Palihapitiya Since we last spoke, there have been a number of mayors elected in this country that are self-declared socialists or democratic socialists of America, PSA, and there’s a rising populist Movement in the United States that seems to be manifesting in many cases candidates that look and act like true deep socialists and want to enact socialist policies. What is the risk to the United States this continues to go the way it’s going? And what is the risk to the United States, do you think, in 2028, if we have a Democrat-controlled House and Senate and a very populous Democrat candidate that looks like a DSA member? Where does this take us? Graham Allison Well, again, good for you all for thinking of uncomfortable, radical questions, but real. So, if you look at the numbers, I’ve been looking at them lately. They’re hard to believe in terms of the split between wealthy and poor, or rich and poor. If you look at who’s benefited for the last generation in terms of the 0.01%, the 1%, the 10%, the 20%, that’s us and all the people that we know virtually. Know third year in a bull market and my goodness here it’s up 15 or 16 percent or this 80 or 70 percent of people this is not part of their lives and when i look at the numbers about both what I think the facts are and then even more people’s perception uh uh it’s just not stable in a democracy. If everybody gets a vote, and if the top 10 or 20 percent are taking 80 percent or 70 percent of the pie, that’s not stable and sustainable, I think. And it’s a political invitation for a populist and demagogic, I mean, you don’t even have to be a demagogue to say that’s not fair, that’s not reasonable. So I think that it’s not, I mean, this is beyond my, I mean, I can hardly deal with the problems I focus on. This one is one that I look over my shoulder and think, gee, wait a minute. First, this can’t be true. But then whenever I’ve been looking into the numbers lately, they look as bad as they appear. And then this is extremely dangerous. And I would say, yes. And so I haven’t people talking about plausible ways in which, you know, this could be addressed. But I think it’s an invitation, you know, for some more radical ideas. And while I like very much the Trump accounts for kids to give them some stake, I think that’s a fantastic thing. I could probably be persuaded that people, even at my level of income, should pay another 10% of taxes or whatever for some more adjustment. I think the kind of adjustments that are basically putting people on the dole or support for non-productive or semi-productive activity makes me very uncomfortable. I mean, unless they’re lame or ill or aging. Jason Calacanis You’re referring to UBI proposals, people getting a universal basic income. That takes motivation. Graham Allison That makes me less. I like incentive. I mean, I think the stuff of America has been the opportunity for people to be incentivized, to invent, create, and create wealth that’s benefits for everybody. But if the jam is not getting spread to 70% of the people, that’s not a sustainable political situation. And I think, I mean, I thought in the New York campaign, we got to see some preview of a bit of this. (Time 0:56:27)